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NO. 47169-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-16-39814
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Johnny Paul Taylor pleaded guilty to felony possession of a
controlled substance. The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. After Mr. Taylor participated in a "rider," the district court
placed him on supervised probation for a period of seven years. Mr. Taylor later admitted to
violating his probation, and the district court revoked probation and executed the underlying
sentence. On appeal, Mr. Taylor asserts the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
his probation and executed the underlying sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
A Boise Police Department officer conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle for having a
broken tail light and an illegible rear license plate. (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI),
p.3.) 1 Mr. Taylor, the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, consented to a search of the
vehicle. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Taylor attempted to conceal an item when the officer escorted him out
of the vehicle, and in the ensuing struggle with the officer, Mr. Taylor threw a small plastic
container under the vehicle. (See PSI, p.3.) The small plastic container tested presumptively
positive for methamphetamine. (See PSI, p.3.) Mr. Taylor also had a hypodermic needle on his
person. (See PSI, p.3.)
The State charged Mr. Taylor by Information with possession of a controlled substance,
felony, I.C. § 37-2732(c), and possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, I.C. §37-2734A.
(R., pp.33-34.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Taylor pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance. (See R., pp.39, 41-49.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.68-70.)
While on his "rider," Mr. Taylor participated in Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions for
Substance Abuse and Thinking for a Change program. (See PSI, p.104.) Rider program staff
recommended the district court consider placing Mr. Taylor on probation, because he "has
worked hard at making himself a better person while here. He entered into the program with an
open and willing attitude, and made the choice to be firm, bold, and hold himself accountable.
To that end, he approached all lessons with a serious and committed mindset." (PSI, pp.107-08.)
The district court subsequently placed Mr. Taylor on supervised probation for a period of seven
years. (R., pp. 73-78.)
1

All citations to the PSI refer to the 145-page PDF version of the Presentence Report and its
attachments.
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About a year later, the State filed a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation,
alleging Mr. Taylor had violated his probation. (R., pp.79-81.) Mr. Taylor admitted to violating
his probation by failing to participate in rider aftercare programming, and by absconding from
supervision. (Tr., p.4, L.12 - p.5, L. 13; see R., p.80.)
At the probation violation disposition hearing, Mr. Taylor recommended that the district
court place him back on probation, and also consider drug court screening. (See Tr., p.10, L.18 p.13, L.14.) The State recommended that the district court revoke probation and execute the
underlying sentence.

(See Tr., p.7, Ls.14-17, p.9, Ls.18-19.)

The district court revoked

Mr. Taylor's probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.118-20.)
Mr. Taylor filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order Revoking
Probation, Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment. (R., pp.121-23.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Taylor's probation and executed
his underlying sentence of seven years, with two years fixed?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Taylor's Probation And
Executed His Underlying Sentence Of Seven Years, With Two Years Fixed
Mr. Taylor asserts the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation
and executed his underlying sentence.

The district court should have instead followed

Mr. Taylor's recommendations by placing him back on probation and directing that he be
screened for drug court. (See Tr., p.10, L.18 -p.13, L.14.)
A district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation under certain
circumstances.

LC. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 & 20-222.
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"A district court's decision to revoke

probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.”
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). In reviewing a district court’s discretionary
decision, appellate courts conduct an inquiry to determine whether the district court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of its discretion, acted
consistently with the applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation proceeding.
Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105. First, the appellate court determines “whether the defendant violated
the terms of his probation.” Id. “If it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the
terms of his probation, the second question is what should be the consequences of that
violation.” Id.
Mr. Taylor concedes he admitted to violating his probation. (See Tr., p.4, L.12 – p.5,
L.13.) When a probationer admits to a direct violation of his probation agreement, no further
inquiry into the question is required. State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Thus,
this Court may go to the second step of the analysis and determine whether the district court
abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Taylor’s probation. State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670,
672 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted). As Idaho’s appellate courts have held, “[i]f a
knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district court’s decision to revoke
probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106 (quoting
State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001)).
However, probation may not be revoked arbitrarily. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053,
1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The purpose of probation is to provide an opportunity to be rehabilitated
under proper control and supervision. Peterson, 123 Idaho at 50. Thus, in determining whether
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to revoke probation, a court must consider whether probation is meeting the objective of
rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho
274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The district court may revoke probation if it reasonably concludes
from the defendant’s conduct that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose. Adams,
114 Idaho at 1055. The district court may consider the defendant’s conduct both before and
during the probationary period. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987).
Here, Mr. Taylor acknowledged, “I’m standing before the Court today because I broke
the rules and the requirements of my probation.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.10-12.) He told the district court:
“If you are expecting an excuse for my behavior, I don’t have one. I put myself into a situation
where I knew I was going to relapse, but I did it anyways. And I take full accountability for my
decision.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-16.)
Moreover, Mr. Taylor’s counsel explained that Mr. Taylor “had a bicycle accident that
resulted in a pretty serious injury.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7.) The notes of Mr. Taylor’s probation
officer indicate Mr. Taylor reported the accident only a few days after being placed on probation.
(See PSI, p.124.) Mr. Taylor wrote that he had been riding his BMX bike at a skate park when
he wrecked, fracturing his eye and cheekbone in five places. (See PSI, p.124.) He stated he had
to have surgery the following week, and had been given prescription medications including
hydrocodone and acetaminophen. (See PSI, p.124.) Defense counsel told the district court that
Mr. Taylor later “acknowledged not wanting to use any of the prescriptions that they have given
him for fear that it was going to spiral things worse.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.10-13.) The probation
officer’s notes reflect that, about two or three weeks after the accident, Mr. Taylor met with the
probation officer and stated “he flushed the [V]icodin prescription he received because it ‘isn’t
worth the risk’ of going down that path again.” (See PSI, p.125.)
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Mr. Taylor further recognized that he was "guilty of leaving the state and walking away
from my aftercare classes. . . . I understand that I did not follow the correct steps necessary to
leave the state and go to Oregon to see my sons, and that I should have requested a travel
permit." (Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.3.) Also, Mr. Taylor's counsel put Mr. Taylor's decision to
go to Oregon in the context of Mr. Taylor's mother, who also lives in Oregon, being ill. (See
Tr., p.10, Ls.14-15; PSI, pp.132, 135.) Mr. Taylor asked the district court: "Please give me
another chance at probation not only to show you, but to show my son Malachi who is due here
in Nampa on October 3rd . Let him come into the arms of his father, not into the arms of Health
and Welfare, something I wasn't so fortunate to have." (Tr., p.13, Ls.6-11.) He requested the
chance to "show the Court I'm not going to follow into the footsteps of my fathers, and that I can
do better, and I can be better." (Tr., p.13, Ls.12-14.)
Based on the above, Mr. Taylor asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence. The district court should have
placed him back on probation and directed that he be screened for drug court.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Taylor respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 7th day ofNovember, 2019.

Isl Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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